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Survey of Professional Responsibility
legal profession's ethical boundaries in drafting and enforcing
partnership agreements.
Christine Ardita
" . AND JUSTICE FOR ALL"? - THE BAR, THE INDIGENT AND
MANDATORY PRO BONO
" 'Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with con-
ditions' . . . . [A lawyer is] an officer of the court, and, like
the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends
of justice .... He might be assigned as counsel for the needy,
in causes criminal or civil, serving without pay .... All this is
undisputed." 1
INTRODUCTION
Pro bono publico literally means "for the public good."' The his-
tory of pro bono work can be traced back to the Roman era.' The
United States pro bono tradition is deeply rooted in English com-
mon law." Proposals to make pro bono obligatory have raised is-
People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928) (em-
phasis added). See also O'Connor, Legal Education and Social Responsibility, 53 FORDHAM. L.
REV. 659, 661 (1985). "Implicit in all [pro bono programs] is the concept that lawyers have
moral and social responsibilities in such instances and that those responsibilities need to be
discharged by the Bar, willingly, and some would say, even unwillingly." Id.
BLACK's LAW DIC-rIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990).
Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 385 (1923) (Roman bar
advocated legal service without recompense). See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633,
636 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966). A lawyer is subject to certain obliga-
tions "imposed upon him by the ancient traditions of his profession and as an officer assist-
ing the courts in the administration of justice" which include legal services to the indigent.
Id. But see Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 343, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854,
858 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). "A careful examination of the 'deeply rooted' and 'ancient tradi-
tion' reveals a custom far more honored in its breach than in its observance." Id.; Shapiro,
The Enigma of The Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735, 749 (1980) (claims reliance
on Roman history is misplaced).
4 Tudzin, Pro Bono Work. Should It Be Mandatory or Voluntary, 12 J. LEGAL PROF. 103, 119
(1987). "Historically lawyers were considered to be 'officers of the court.' The term was
used in England originally to express the view that special responsibilities and duties at-
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sues which have been vigorously debated.' Recently, one such
proposal has been submitted in New York by the Committee to
Improve the Availability of Legal Services.' The Committee's pur-
pose was to review and report on "the extent of the unmet need
for civil legal services, the scope and operation of the existing net-
works recruiting private lawyers for pro bono assignments, and
mechanisms for inducing cooperation and compliance and sanc-
tioning the opposite."' The Committee, in its Final Report (the
tached to the privilege of becoming a member of the legal profession." Id. See Dillon, 346
F.2d at 637 (appointment of counsel based on common law and expanded by implementa-
tion of colonial statutes); In re Snyder, 734 F.2d 334, 338-39 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 634 (1985). "The profession of law rests upon its commitment to public
service and has long been recognized as a profession that requires its membership to en-
gage in pro bono activities." Id.; House v. Whitis, 64 Tenn. (5 Baxter) 690, 692 (1875).
"The court has a right to command the services of counsel for persons unable to pay, in
civil as well as criminal cases. Where a lawyer takes his license he takes it burthened with
these honorary obligations." Id. (statutory citations omitted). Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro
Bono: Historical and Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 255, 257 (1981) (duty of
mandatory pro bono is merely reaffirmation of professional tradition as evidenced by Ca-
nons of Professional Ethics enacted in 1908); Shapiro, supra note 3, at 756. "That federal
courts may require lawyers to represent indigents without compensation, at least in crimi-
nal or quasi-criminal matters, seems well established." Id. (citations omitted). See also
HowswoRT, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 491 (1943). "Tradition of the representations of
indigents has existed for nearly half a millenium." Id.; 11 Hen c.12 (1494). The Justice
shall appoint attorneys for the fame poor person or persons. Id.; Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep.
1535, 1535 (1894). "Trevanion ... moved to have an attorney assigned [to] him, for none
would voluntarily appear for him; and the Court appointed one at his own nomination."
But see Cunningham, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 343, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 858. "Most of the cases that
deal with the rights of indigents in civil cases have been decided within the last fifteen
years." Id. (citations omitted); State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 767 (Mo. 1985)
(rejects notion of ancient and established tradition giving rise to obligation to serve
indigents).
' See The Florida Bar, 432 So. 2d 39, 40. (Fla. 1983). A proposal requiring mandatory
pro bono services by attorneys was sought by petitioners. Id. The proposal was rejected on
the grounds that "[w]e are a democratic nation with heavy emphasis on the individual
rights of all citizens." Id. The court reasoned that: "[wie have been loathe to coerce invol-
untary servitude in all walks of life; we do not forceably take property without just compen-
sation; we do not mandate acts of charity." Id. at 41. However, the court did urge volun-
tary participation by attorneys to provide free legal services for those unable to pay. Id. at
41-42. See also Carroll, Current Professional Issues: Addressing Obligations and Exploring Op-
portunities, N.Y.S. B.J. 10 (Feb. 1990) (in New York, 14 local bar associations have an-
nounced opposition to mandatory pro bono); Comment, Mandatoy Pro Bono: The Path to
Equal Justice, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 355, 362-63 (1989) (Washington and Oregon state
legislatures have studied mandatory pro bono program but neither has made it out of
committee).
' See Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services, Final Report, April 27,
1990 [hereinafter Marrero Report]. The Committee was appointed by Chief Judge Wach-
ter of the New York Court of Appeals with Victor Marrero as its chairman. Id. at 148-49.
7 Id. at 148.
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Marrero Report) established that the legal needs of the poor were
not being met by current available resources8 and in response ad-
vanced mandatory pro bono as a mechanism to increase the access
and availability of legal services to the indigent.9
The Marrero Report's proposal would require all lawyers ad-
mitted and actively practicing law in New York 0 to contribute
forty hours every two years1' to qualifying pro bono services. 2
The obligation of each attorney could be satisfied through indi-
vidual efforts or through services performed on the attorney's be-
half as part of an aggregate effort." Additionally, attorneys who
8 Id. at 98-107 (describes extent of unmet legal needs and inadequacy of volunteer pro
bono).
9 See id. at 8-9, 13-14, 115-23. The Committee, in recognizing the problem as societal in
nature, not just peculiar to the bar, has suggested additional measures such as increased
funding of legal assistance projects and expansion of appointments under the Article 18-B
panel program (program, pursuant to statute, for paid representation of indigents in crimi-
nal matters). Id. at 13-14.
"0 See Marrero Report, supra note 6, at 9-11, 36, 150. All attorneys would be required to
perform pro bono services, including attorneys working in "government agencies, legal
services and public interest organizations . . .and law school faculty .... " Id. at 10-11.
The committee recommended exemptions for judges and non-practicing or retired attor-
neys. Id. at 10-11, 151-52. The proposal also recommends exemptions from the program
for "extraordinary circumstances such as illness, incapacity, long-term personal or business
absence from the jurisdiction and other special financial or personal hardships occurring in
any particular year." Id. at 11.
11 Id. at 10-11, 34, 150. See Report of the Commission on Professionalism, 112 F.R.D.
243, 297 (1986). "The number of hours given by a lawyer [through pro bono] will in most
cases be insignificant to his or her practice, while the benefits to the recipients can be
considerable." Id. See also Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 349-350,
222 Cal. Rptr. 854, 862-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (raises issue of attorneys who are admitted
to a jurisdiction but do not practice there); Smith, A Mandatory Pro Bono Service Standard-Its
Time Has Come, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 727, 731-32 (1981). "Financial contributions, no mat-
ter how substantial, cannot always discharge the individual attorney's obligation. The legal
profession is not an elitist organization in which wealth can buy amnesty for failing to do
what all lawyers are obligated to do .... These obligations must be nontransferable." Id.
"' Marrero Report, supra note 6, at 10, 150-51. Qualifying pro bono services include:
[a] those rendered in civil matters to persons who cannot afford to pay counsel, and
also legal services in criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to
provide funds for legal representation; [b] those related to improvement of the ad-
ministration of justice by simplifying the legal process for, or increasing the availabil-
ity and quality of legal services to poor persons; and [c] those provided to charitable,
public interest organizations on matters which are designed predominantly to ad-
dress the needs of poor persons.
Id. at 10. See also id. at 47-53 (detailed discussion of above categories).
18 Id. at 11, 57-59, 151. Attorneys could aggregate their individual requirements and
satisfy their obligation by one or more members of the group performing the required
services. Id. But cf. Faulkner, At Issue: Mandatory Pro Bono, 75 A.B.A. J. 53 (Oct. 1989).
"[F]irms will pay pro-bono counsel a fraction of that paid to entry-level associates. The
proposal apparently reflects the view that the wealthy should be able to buy their way out
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are practicing in firms of ten lawyers or less would be entitled to
utilize a buyout provision, whereby the equivalent cash value of all
or part of the required service" would be contributed to an eligi-
ble legal services or public interest organization." Attorneys
would be required to certify on their biennial registration state-
ments that they have complied with the program. 6
I. THE DISPUTE
While it is undeniable that a substantial gap exists between the
need for and the availability of legal services for the poor, 17 there
is discord in the legal community as to how this need should be
met.'8 Mandatory pro bono, as a major component of a compre-
of public service, and that representing the poor is less important than representing paying
clients." Id.
" Marrero Report, supra note 6, at 11, 59-72, 151. Attorneys in firms of ten lawyers or
less could make a monetary contribution of $50 per hour for "all or any part of the obliga-
tion" to "an eligible legal services or public interest organization." Id. at 11. See also Sha-
piro, supra note 3, at 781 (promoting option of cash buyout); Pro Bono Legal Service: An
Executive Committee Position, 36 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 9, 11 (1981) (financial support as useful
as service therefore should dishcarge obligation). Contra Marrero Report, supra note 6, at
141. Sol Neil Corbin, a member of the Committee states: "If compulsory service is indeed
justified, it should not be possible to evade that duty by hiring someone else to perform the
work or by purchasing an exemption." Id.; Smith, supra note 11, at 781 (buyout option
viewed by some as "copout").
1 Marrero Report, supra note 6, at 11. See also id. at 53-54, 150-52 (discussing types of
organizations that qualify for monetary contribution option).
16 Id. at 10-11, 151-52.
17 See New York Legal Needs Study, Draft Final Report, Oct. 11, 1989 (analysis of legal
problems facing poor in New York State). See also Report of Comm'n on Professionalism,
112 F.R.D. 243, 299 (1986). "It should come as no surprise to anyone that the poor are
among the least represented members of our society, especially in civil matters." Id.; Smith,
supra note 11, at 727 (attorneys aware of failure of profession to meet needs of poor de-
spite voluntary pro bono efforts); Tudzin, supra note 4, at 110. Many of the poor are never
afforded their day in court "due to attorney inaccessibility and prohibitive costs." Id.; Com-
mittee to Increase the Availability of Legal Services, At Issue: Mandatory Pro Bono, 75 A.B.A.
J. 52 (Oct. 1989).
[T]he imbalance between the need for legal services and their availability under-
mines the legitimacy of the legal system itself. It is grotesque to have a system in
which the law guarantees to the poor that their basic human needs will be met but
which provides individuals no realistic means of enforcing that right.
Id.; Gallett, Who Loves a Lawyer, N.Y.L.J. Sept. 24, 1981, at 3, col. I. "[Elveryone must have
access to ... legal representation [and it] ought not to be considered a luxury. Our Consti-
tution guarantees the same protection to all, but the concept that we are all equal before
the law is mocked if access to the judicial system depends on one's financial means." Id.
"S See generally Annotation, Court Appointment of Attorney to Represent, Without Compensa-
tion Indigent in Civil Action, 52 A.L.R. 4th 1063, 1066-67 (1987) (outlining jurisdictional
discord).
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hensive plan, 9 is a suggested remedy which has met with a great
deal of criticism.2 This controversy over mandatory pro bono has
implicated constitutional,2" as well as non-constitutional, 2 issues.
It will be the objective of this Survey to outline the primary ele-
ments of the conflict over the implementation of mandatory pro
bono programs.
II. NON-CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
There has been considerable controversy over the precise posi-
tion an attorney occupies and his corresponding duties to the pro-
fession, the bar and the public.2"
A. Professional Responsibility as Officer of the Court
Lawyers assume certain obligations as a quid pro quo for the
rights and privileges they enjoy.2 4 These obligations arise from
their position as officers of the court" and as professionals
" See supra note 9 and accompanying text (setting forth additional remedies); Report of
Comm'n on Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 299 (1986). "Pro bono [programs] while no
panacea, are a first step." Id.
" See Graham, Mandatory Pro Bono-The Shape of Things to Come?, 73 A.B.A. J. 62, 62-63
(Dec. 1987). "Many view mandatory pro bono as a fundamentally flawed concept [which]
threatens the effective delivery of legal services to the poor." Id. But see Tudzin, supra note
4, at 117 (pro bono program should be implemented even if change is minimal).
, See infra notes 44-71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 23-43 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
14 See The Florida Bar, 432 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 1983) (emphasizing lawyers duty to pro-
vide indigents with legal services due to unique position in society); HENRY S. DRINKERS,
LEGAL ETHics 62 (1953) (recognizing lawyers' duty to represent indigents in civil and crimi-
nal matters); Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Law-
yer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 438, 443 (1965) (exclusive franchise to
practice law brings responsibility to assure services available to needy); Tudzin, supra note
4, at 111 (obligation to provide free or reduced fee legal services to poor based on privi-
leges and responsibilities lawyers derive from society). See also Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102
Utah 548, 552, 133 P.2d 325, 326 (1943) (majority of courts recognize attorney as "officer
of the court" with duty to render services to poor gratuitously by custom).
,' See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 728 (1973). "It has been stated many times that
lawyers are officers of the court." Id. (quoting Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399
(1956)); In re Snyder, 734 F.2d 334, 339 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 472 U.S.
634 (1985). "[C]ourt has consistently recognized the duty of an attorney practicing in the
federal courts, as an implied obligation, to serve willingly as an officer of the court in a
capacity pro bono publico .... " Id.; Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 273. "[T]he attorney has a
duty to assist in the administration of justice as a condition of the license to practice and/
or as an officer of the court, and that accepting court appointments is part of that duty."
Id. But see Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 344, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854,
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charged with "promot[ing] the legitimacy, efficacy and equity of
the legal system . . . ." Courts have held that these responsibili-
ties include the rendering of legal services to the needy without
compensation."' And while it is noted that "critics suggest the ad-
ministrative burdens of monitoring compliance with such a system
would be ... difficult," '28 it is argued that faithful execution of this
859 (Ct. App. 1986); State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 767 (Mo. 1985) (re-
jecting view of attorney as officer of the court). "Those precedents that seemingly support
a court's power to conscript an unwilling attorney on the notion that an attorney is an
'officer of the court,' are based upon a misunderstanding of the structure of the British
court system." Id.; Shapiro, supra note 3, at 753. "To justify coerced, uncompensated legal
services on the basis of a firm tradition in England and the United States is to read into
that tradition a story that is not there." Id.
" Marrero Report, supra note 6, at 27. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
792 (1975). "[Llawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administer-
ing justice, and have historically been 'officers of the court.' " Id.; H. DRINKERS, supra note
24, at 313. Canon 12 of the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics asserted that "it should
never be forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a
mere money-getting trade." Id.; Smith, supra note 11, at 729 (onus on lawyers to utilize
"special and unique skills in the public interest"); Discussion Draft of ABA Model Rules,
48 U.S.L.W. 1, 27 (1980). ABA Delegates stated: "[I]t is the basic professional responsibil-
ity of each lawyer engaged in the practice of law to provide publilc interest legal services.
This responsibility derives from the lawyers commitment to the laws ideal of equal justice."
Id. Cf. Cunningham, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 355, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 866 (attorney has duty to
client, courts and justice system to render legal assistance in accordance with resources he
possesses); Cahn and Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-The Public Interest in Public
Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1012 n.16 (1970). "The market is not for 'legal services;'
the market is for justice." Id. But see Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 266 (contending availabil-
ity of free legal asistance will increase meritless litigation and further burden courts); Sha-
piro, supra note 3, at 779 (same).
' See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (attorneys bound to serve when ap-
pointed as officers of the court); Dillon v. United States, 346 F.2d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966). "Lawyers traditional obligation to represent indigents did
not include any right to compensation." Id.; State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Mo.
1971) (Seiler, J., concurring). "The lawyers cannot escape being officers of the court and
cannot escape a certain amount of pro bono publico work, which inevitably go with the spe-
cial and exclusive privilege of being allowed to represent others in the court." Id. See also
Ruckenbrod, 102 Utah at 563, 133 P.2d at 331. "The attorney, because of his position as
officer of the court, can be compelled by the court to render gratuitous services in the
defense of indigents, and an attorney who has been so appointed is not entitled to compen-
sation .... " Id.; Jacox v. Jacox, 43 App. Div. 2d 716, 717, 350 N.Y.S.2d 435, 437 (2d
Dep't 1974). The members of the Bar have a personal obligation "to willingly accept as-
signments made by the Bench and to help those who cannot afford financially to help
themselves." Id.
" Tudzin, supra note 4, at 118. See generally Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 15-16 (1854).
Commenting on pro bono, the court stated that "honorary duties are hardly susceptible of
enforcement in a court of law." Id.; Luban, Mandatory Pro Bono: A Workable (and Moral)
Plan, 1985 MicH. B.J., 280 (Mar. 1985) (describing "coupon plan" method of enforce-
ment); Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 269 (profession must be willing to take on obligation
before it can be enforced). But see Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 264. "Beyond the simple self-
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obligation is imperative to discharge duties as officers of the
court,2 9 to maintain the integrity of the profession 0 and to en-
enforcement system, the proposed new obligation would be enforced in the same ways as
the Disciplinary Rules have always been enforced .... " (referring to biennial reporting
proposal under 1979 plan - duplicative of current proposal). Id. "Biennial certification by
the attorney of compliance with the program will satisfy the obligation without violating
the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 268-69. But cf. Pro Bono Legal Service, An Executive Com-
mittee Position, 36 REC. A.B. Crry N.Y. 9, 13 (1981). "Reporting requirement would suggest
an unwarranted lack of confidence in the members of the profession therefore no require-
ment of reporting is appropriate." Id.
,' See Bradshaw v. United States Dist. Ct. for the So. Dist. of Cal., 742 F.2d 515, 518
(9th Cir. 1984). "Failure to come forward to assist indigent litigants at the request of the
court is an indication of loss of professionalism. It is also a violation of the spirit, if not the
letter, of ethical considerations ...." Id.; United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (4th
Cir. 1965) (discussing representing indigents as condition to practicing law), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 978 (1966); Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528, 532 (Ala.), appeal dismissed, 444
U.S. 803 (1979) (representing indigents duty owed by professsion); People v. Randolph, 35
Ill. 2d 24, 28, 219 N.E.2d 337, 340 (1966). "An attorney is an officer of the court and his
license to practice comes with it the steadfast obligation to serve the court whenever called
upon to do so." Id. (emphasis in original). Yarborough v. Superior Court of Napa County,
150 Cal. App. 3d 388, 395, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741 (Ct. App. 1983). "An attorney is an
officer of the court before which he or she was admitted to practice and is expected to
discharge his or her professional responsibilities [to represent indigents] at all times, partic-
ularly when expressly called upon by the courts to do so." Id.; T. COOLEY. CONSTTUTIONAL
LIMrrAIONS 334 (1868). "[Representing indigent defendants] is a duty the lawyer owes to
his profession, the court and the cause of justice to serve without compensation. No one is
at liberty to decline such an appointment, and it is to be hoped that few would be disposed
to do so." Id. But see Scott, 688 S.W.2d at 769. "The courts of this state have no inherent
power to appoint or compel attorneys to serve in civil actions without compensation." Id.;
Caruth v. Pickney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir. 1982) (court can only request, not re-
quire, attorney to represent indigent), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214 (1983).
'a See Bradshaw, 742 F.2d at 518 (professionalism demands that attorneys render assis-
tance to indigents); In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 441, 330 N.E.2d 53, 58, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87,
94 (1975) (attorneys, pursuant to canons of profession, have obligation to perform services
for indigents). ABA Model Rule 6.1 states:
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge this
responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons
of limited means or to public service or charitable groups or organizations by service
in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession, and by
financial support for organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited
means.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983). The comment to Rule 6.1 states:
[T]his rule expreseses [the basic responsibility of lawyers to provide public interest
legal services] but is not intended to be enforced through the disciplinary process.
The provision of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues
to be an obligation of each lawyer as well as the profession generally, but the efforts
of individual lawyers are often not enough to meet that need.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 comment 3 (1983). See also Luban, supra
note 28, at 283 (Mar. 1985). "Pro bono should not be viewed as conscription but rather a
reshaping of the lawyers professional role." Id.; Shapiro, supra note 3, at 789. "Lawyers..
. can perhaps do the most to reduce the general level of dissatisfaction by working for
those changes that will reduce the demand for their services." Id.; Smith, supra note 11, at
393
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hance the public image of the Bar. 1
B. Monopoly and the Right to Regulate
Attorneys have been granted a monopoly over the practice of
law32 and with this exclusive privilege they "hold the key to the
system of justice."3 3 Proponents of mandatory pro bono urge that
this privilege brings with it the responsibility to insure that repre-
sentation is available to those who need it but are unable to obtain
proper legal assistance. 4 Without an attorney, a layman will usu-
734 (law profession is dynamic and lawyers should seek changes to meet society's needs);
Tudzin, supra note 4, at 106. "The Model Code contains nothing affirmative about an
attorney's duty to provide free or limited fee services to [the poor]. Any mandatory calling
for lawyers to satisfy those needs has been deleted and what is left ... is merely suggestive
and aspirational." Id.
S' See Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 (1824) (Marshall, J.). "The profession
of an attorney is of great importance to an individual ... [o]n the other hand the respecta-
bility of the bar should be maintained." Id. See also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 723-24
(1973). "[Lawyers should] function in a manner which will foster public confidence in the
profession and, consequently, the judicial system." Id.; At Issue, supra note 17, at 52. "It is
insufficient for individual lawyers to expect that some amorphous entity comprising 'the
profession' will answer [the] needs [of the poor]. Each lawyer has [that] responsibility ...
and lawyers fail the poor, the public interest, the profession and themselves when they fail
to do so." Id.; Fuller & Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44
A.B.A. J. 1159, 1216 (1958). "Popular misconceptions of the advocate's function disappear
when the lawyer pleads without a fee, and true value of his service to society is immediately
perceived." Id.; Shapiro, supra note 3, at 789. "When a lawyer comes forward to perform a
service because of a sense of responsibility to the profession and to society, something is
surely gained in the measure of public respect for the calling." Id. But see Lardent, At Issue:
Mandatory Pro Bono, 74 A.B.A. J. 47 (May 1988). "Compelling attorneys to provide
mandatory pro bono will detract from public's perception of profession." Id.; Smith, supra
note 11, at 727. "The legal profession will not maintain the public's respect if it supports a
random and haphazard standard under which some lawyers contribute pro bono service
while others contribute little or none." Id. But cf. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 789. "When
unwilling lawyers are drafted into service, with all quarrels over the nature and extent of
their duty that are bound to occur, public esteem may well decline." Id.
" See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644 (1985). "As an officer of the court, a member of
the bar enjoys singular powers that others do not possess; by virtue of admission, members
of the bar share a kind of monopoly granted only to lawyers." Id.; Tudzin, supra note 4, at
111. "Lawyers' monopoly of the legal market requires them to provide free/reduced fee
legal services." Id. Contra Shapiro, supra note 3, at 777. "To say, then, that lawyers have a
monopoly, or even a powerful cartel, is to misrepresent the dynamics of the present-day
practice of the law." Id.
" Forger, At Issue: Mandatory Pro Bono, 74 A.B.A. J. 46 (May 1988). See Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45, 67-69 (1932). "The right to be heard would be . . . of little avail
[without] counsel." Id.; Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 279. "[S]ubstantive rights and proce-
dural remedies for the benefit and protection of the poor . . . become empty promises
without lawyers to vindicate the rights and pursue the remedies." Id. (citations omitted).
" The Florida Bar, 432 So. 2d 39, 41 (Fla. 1983). "There are people in need of legal
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ally be incapable of adequately representing himself,35 especially
when opposed by "practiced and carefully counselled adversa-
ries.""6 To meet the shortage of representation for the indigent,
courts have held that a state can prescribe mandatory pro bono as
a condition for the granting of a license to practice law."7 If the
Bar refuses to adhere to this condition, it is feasible that the state
and society could abolish the lawyers' monopoly and employ alter-
native means to satisfy the public's legal needs.38
services who are unable to pay for those services. All persons, however, should have the
opportunity of obtaining effective legal services and should have meaningful access to the
courts." Id. See also Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 918, 553 P.2d 565, 573, 132
Cal. Rptr. 405, 413 (1976) (indigent defendant in civil lawsuit entitled to appointment of
counsel); In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 437, 330 N.E.2d 53, 55-56, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90
(1975) (right to counsel and due process carry with them provision of counsel if defendant
unable to afford it); Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 274 (civil litigants entitled to appointed
counsel if case adversely affects fundamental rights). But see Tudzin, supra note 4, at 105
(compelled representation inappropriate in civil cases). See generally Note, The Indigents
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967) (discussing problems indigents have
in obtaining counsel, unfair contingency agreements and solution for granting indigents
counsel).
" See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) (even the most dedicated trial judges
are bound to overlook meritious cases without counsel focusing issues); Powell, 287 U.S. at
69. "Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law." Id.; Godpuster, The Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L.
REV. 223 (1970) (discussing difficulty indigents have bringing case to trial). See generally
Douglas, The Right to Counsel, 45 MINN. L. REV. 693, 694 (1961) (indigents subject to dis-
crimination due to lack of availability of competent counsel). But see State ex rel. Scott v.
Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 765 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). In rejecting the monopoly argument,
the Scott court stated that "no individual is denied an opportunity to argue his own cause."
Id.; Shapiro, supra note 3, at 776. "[O]utside the courtroom, a person has many alterna-
tives to the hiring of a lawyer, ranging from self help with the aid of an increasing number
of books and manuals to the assistance of a trained adviser without a law degree." Id.
" Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1963).
17 See Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct. for the So. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 109
S.Ct. 1814, 1824 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) "[A] court's power to require a lawyer to
render assistance to the indigent is firmly rooted in the authority to define the terms and
conditions upon which members are admitted to the bar." Id. (citations omitted); Cunning-
ham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 349, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854, 862 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (imposition of burden as condition to licensure permissible provided it is borne
equally by all lawyers). See also Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 295 (licensing imposes obliga-
tions on professionals). But see DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d at 440 (Alaska
1987) (license to practice law protected by due process, therefore cannot be arbitrarily
revoked); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 553, 133 P.2d 325, 327 (1943) (power of
state to impose duty to render gratuitous services must be based on more than power to
license).
" See Scott, 688 S.W.2d at 765. "Limiting the number of persons who can practice law is
for the benefit of the public." Id. Smith, supra note 11, at 734. "If the legal profession
does not address society's needs, society will satisfy those needs through other means, thus
reducing the autonomy that the profession currently enjoys." Id.; Tudzin, supra note 4, at
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C. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Opponents of mandatory pro bono contend that such a pro-
gram, through representation by inexperienced attorneys, may
"deprive the indigent of effective assistance of counsel."39 Con-
versely, it is asserted that "[m]ost civil lawyers are generalists,""'
engaged in a comprehensive practice, after a broad based legal
education.4 A difficulty may arise if a lawyer encounters a legal
situation with which he is unfamiliar or uncomfortable,42 how-
ever, the "problem is easily rectified by providing supervision and
111. "Lawyers have been allowed to have the monopoly." Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Smith,
supra note 11, at 733 (asserting that public grants lawyers exclusive right to practice there-
fore, public should receive some benefit in return).
3' See Cunningham, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 865. See also Report of
Commission on Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 298 (1986). "Commission . . .does not
recommend mandatory pro bono because 1) antithetical to conscript lawyers 2) would cre-
ate situations whereby lawyers unwillingly represent clients to the detriment of those cli-
ents." Id.; Graham, supra note 20, at 64 (widespread concern about inferior legal services
for poor). But see infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (setting forth proposition that
potential for deprivation of effective assistance of counsel is easily remedied).
40 In re Snyder, 734 F.2d 334, 340 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 634
(1985). See State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 406, 217 A.2d 441, 444-45 (1966). The court stated:
The law is a vast field and no man is in command of all of it. Lawyers ... move from
scene to scene, absorbing the special features of each. A capacity to that end goes to
the essence of the practice of law. A lawyer's training equips him for it .... [A]nd
although a new scene may demand a greater initial effort, the newcomer may well
bring a zeal and a freshness long lost to a tired or comfortable expert.
Id. But see Luke v. County of Los Angeles, 269 Cal. App. 2d 495, 499, 74 Cal. Rptr. 771,
773-75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). "[T]oday's law comprehends a myriad of different processes,
and lawyers must necessarily specialize in only a few of them in order to achieve and main-
tain competency in their work." Id. See generally Mindes, Proliferation, Specialization and
Certification: The Splitting of the Bar, 11 U. TOL. L. REV. 273, 274 (1980) (recent studies on
growth and diversity of Bar characterize the profession as a complex "galaxy of non-in-
terchange specialists").
41 See Rush, 46 N.J. at 406, 217 A.2d at 444. But see BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED
STATES (1951) passim (contends assigning of pro bono attorneys depends in large part on
newly admitted lawyers seeking to gain experience).
42 See State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 768 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (contending
quality of representation will decrease proportionately to loss of choice of attorney); Cun-
ningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 355, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854, 866 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (attorney has duty to client, courts and judicial system to render legal assistance
in accordance with the resources he possesses); Humbach, Serving the Public Interest: An
Overstated Objective, 65 A.B.A. J. 564, 566 (Apr. 1979) (legal problems of the poor are not
simple or unimportant and deserve adequate time and skill). Cf. Lardent, supra note 31, at
47. "[Mlany attorneys won't do work outside their specialty because they don't want to do
a bad job." Id. THE MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 6-101 (West 1989)
states: "A lawyer shall not handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is
not competent to handle ... [or] handle a legal ihatter without preparation adequate in the
circumstances." Id.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
When a state seeks to require a lawyer to perform mandatory
pro bono, opponents contend there are constitutional issues which
undermine the legitimacy of such a requirement."' Constitutional
objections are set forth primarily'" under the fifth,'6 thirteenth 7
and fourteenth' 8 amendments to the United States Constitution.
A. The Fifth Amendment
Opponents of mandatory pro bono classify legal services, the
"lawyers stock in trade,"' 9 as property, suggesting they are enti-
4" Tudzin, supra note 4, at 117. See Forger, At Issue: Mandatory Pro Bono, 74 A.B.A. J. 46
(May 1988). "There is not a single skill that can't be devoted to the poor, including anti-
trust and tax .... 'I'm not qualified is a cop-out.'" Id.; Marin-Rosa and Stepter, Orange
County-Mandatory Pro Bono in a Voluntary Bar Association, 59 FLA. B.J. 21, 22 (Dec. 1985).
"The funds collected in lieu of services are used to staff an office with attorneys and parale-
gals. Services performed are aimed at the specific needs of the poor." Id.
44 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 347, 222 Cal. Rptr.
854, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). "The right to practice law.., must not be predicated upon
the relinquishment of constitutional rights." Id. (citations omitted). See generally Shapiro,
supra note 3, at 738-39 (discussing constitutional issues raised by state-implemented
mandatory pro bono).
46 Opponents of mandatory pro bono programs have raised an argument under the first
amendment contending that compelled representation deprives the lawyer of an element of
professional choice and freedom of association. See e.g., Scott, 688 S.W.2d at 768. See also
Cunningham, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 356, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 867. "Mandatory pro bono repre-
sentation prevents an attorney from making a determination as to whom he or she wishes
to represent." Id.; Shapiro, supra note 3, at 763 (Supreme Court extends free speech to
include right to associate with others and "to be free from coerced association with causes,
ideas, and conduct espoused or engaged in by others.") (citations omitted); Rosenfeld,
supra note 4, at 268. Critics contend that a "mandatory obligation would necessarily in-
volve inquiry by an enforcement body into the nature of attorney-client relationships, and
provide at least a 'chilling effect' upon the exercise of first amendment freedoms by both
lawyers and their clients." Id.
" See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text (discussion of fifth amendment issues aris-
ing from mandatory pro bono programs).
' See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text (discussion of thirteenth amendment is-
sues arising from mandatory pro bono programs).
48 See infra notes 64-71 and accompnaying text (discussion of fourteenth amendment is-
sues arising from mandatory pro bono programs).
"" See Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 17 (1854). In this case the court noted that:
To the attorney his profession is his means of livelihood. His legal knowledge is his
capital stock. His professional services are no more at the mercy of the public as to
remuneration, than are the goods of the merchant, or the crops of the farmer, or
the wares of the mechanic.
Id. See also Cheatham, supra note 24, at 444. "The lawyer's stock in trade is intangible - his
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tied to protection under the fifth amendment.50 This argument
frequently analogizes a lawyer to a grocer, concluding that it
would be as unfair to deprive the lawyer of his services as it would
be to deprive the grocer of his goods to feed the hungry.51 How-
ever, proponents argue that "the grocer does not make the hun-
gry worse off by selling to the cash customer; grocery retailing is
not an adversarial profession [while] law retailing is." ' 52 Further-
more, because of the long standing tradition of the profession en-
gaging in pro bono work, which the lawyer is deemed to be aware
of, he cannot object to mandatory pro bono as an "involuntary
taking." 3 When confronted with the issue, the majority of courts
time is fortified by his intellectual and personal qualities, and burdened by his office ex-
penses. To take his stock in trade is like stripping the shelves of the grocer or taking over a
subdivision of the builder." Id.
50 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. This amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.; Menin v. Menin, 79
Misc. 2d 285, 292, 359 N.Y.S.2d. 721, 728 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1974), affid mem.,
48 App. Div. 2d 904, 372 N.Y.S.2d 985 (2d Dep't 1975). "It has been said that the right to
practice in any profession is a 'valuable property right, in which, under the Constitution
and the laws of the State, one is entitled to be protected and secured.' " (quoting In re
Bender v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of New York, 226 App. Div. 627, 631, 30
N.Y.S.2d. 779, 784 (1941)) Id.; Shapiro, supra note 3, at 771. "[S]ervice, with or without a
financial alternative, might be asserted to be a taking without just compensation." Id. Con-
tra "The claim [that mandatory pro bono is not a taking] has been put on the basis that the
authorization to practice law, is a privilege conferred by the state, not a protected property
interest." Id. (citations omitted).
81 See Cheatham, supra note 24, at 445.
It is unfair to put on any working group the burden for providing for the needy
out of its stock and trade. No one would suggest that the individual grocer or
builder should take the responsibility of providing the food and shelter needed by
the poor. The same conclusion applies to the lawyer.
Id. See also Ellman, Book Review Essay: Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy. Lawyers
andJustice an Ethical Study, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116, 168 (1990) (concurring with book au-
thor's assertions regarding requirement of legal service for poor and grocer analogy). Cf.
Caplow, Under Advisement: Attorney Fee Forfeiture and The Supreme Court, 55 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 111, 134 (1989) (analogizing payments by economically deprived to attorneys with
payments for other necessities such as groceries).
52 Luban, supra note 28, at 283. See Ex parte Dibble 310 S.E.2d 440, 442 (S.C. Ct. App.
1983) (disagreeing with proposition that there is no difference between service of lawyer
and grocer based on necessity of judicial system to society).
" See In re Snyder 734 F.2d 334, 338-39 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 472 U.S.
634 (1985). "The profession of law rests upon its committment to public service and has
long been reconized as a profession that requires its membership to engage in pro bono
activities." Id.; United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 978 (1966) (applicant for admission to bar is deemed cognizant of tradition of pro
bono, thus consenting to this obligation and is precluded from raising "involuntary taking"
argument) (citing Kunhardt & Co., Inc. v. United States, 266 U.S. 537 (1925); House v.
Whitis, 64 Tenn. (5 Baxter) 690, 692 (1875) (license to practice law carries with it obliga-
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reject the position that mandatory pro bono is a taking of prop-
erty." Similarly, pro bono has been regarded by some as an obli-
gation"5 and "the Fifth Amendment does not require [payment]
for the performance of a public duty [that is] already owed."56
B. The Thirteenth Amendment
The thirteenth amendment57 was enacted to protect against "in-
voluntary servitude."5 8 Opponents of mandatory pro bono suggest
that this protection encompasses the idea of compelled represen-
tation,59 because such compulsion removes, to some extent, the
tion to serve indigents). See also Dibble, 310 S.E.2d at 441. "For many years courts have
viewed uncompensated service as a duty attendant to the public office which the lawyer
voluntarily seeks. For this reason, the lawyer is not a private citizen being deprived of
property without just compensation or due process." Id.
'" See Dillon, 346 F.2d at 636 (held attorney did not have right to compensation under
fifth amendment because there had been no taking); Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga.
App. 343, 347-48, 148 S.E.2d. 143, 146 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966)
(overwhelming majority of jurisdictions reject argument that mandatory pro bono is taking
of property). But see Shapiro, supra note 3, at 755 (asserting that "claimed majority is not
nearly so solid nor so monolithic").
"See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text (discussing pro bono as obligation of the
Bar).
" Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588 (1973). See Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at
258 (recognizing that the obligation of pro bono is well established, and as such cannot
constitute a taking). See also Dillon, 346 F.2d at 636 (court appointment of counsel not
taking because lawyer is obligated to serve court without compensation). Cf. Butler v. Perry
240 U.S. 328, 329 (1916). State statute required "every able-bodied male person" between
ages of 21 and 45 to work without pay "on the roads and bridges of the several counties"
for six ten hour days each year. Id. Such forced labor by every male was not involuntary
servitude because it was "part of the duty which he owes the public." Id. at 330 (statutory
citation omitted); Maricopa County v. Clifford Corp, 44 Ariz. 506, 507, 39 P.2d. 351, 352
(1934) (citizens obligated to perform services such as jury duty without compensation un-
less a statute otherwise provides).
'" See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. This amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction." Id.
" See The Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n of New Orleans v. The Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing and Slaughter House Co. (The Slaughter House cases), 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69
(1872) (Court stated obvious purpose of thirteenth amendment was to abolish "all shades
and conditions of African slavery"). See generally C. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN
CoNsTITUIoN: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELoPMENT §§ 220-22 (1922) (discussing purpose and ap-
plication of thirteenth amendment).
" See The Florida Bar, 432 So. 2d 39, 41 (Fla. 1983). "We have been loathe to coerce
involuntary servitude in all walks of life; we do not mandate acts of charity." Id.; Humbach,
supra note 42, at 566. Mandatory pro bono "would not violate the letter of thirteenth
amendment but it would surely violate the amendment's spirit." Id. See, e.g., Bedford v. Salt
Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 14, 447 P.2d 193, 195 (1968) (court held uncompensated
service was involuntary servitude in violation of thirteenth amendment). But see Rosenfeld,
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attorney's ability to choose for whom he works.60 However,
mandatory pro bono "bears little resemblance to the bondage of
Afro-Americans which was the amendment's principal target,"61
and courts consistently construe the amendment in accordance
with this narrow purpose. 62 It is noted that critics of mandatory
pro bono fail to reconcile the propriety of coerced service to indi-
gents in criminal cases with the alleged impropriety in the civil
context.68
C. The Fourteenth Amendment
The Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment 6
provides that similarly situated people should be treated in a like
supra note 4, at 292. "Since Butler, the courts have recognized in numerous contexts that
mandated service [such as military conscription] to meet a public need does not offend the
thirteenth amendment." Id.
" See Shapiro, supra note 3, at 774. "An obligation to perform certain work, backed by
the sanction of contempt, professional discipline, or loss of livelihood, is about as direct an
invasion of a person's control over his labor as can be imagined." Id. See also State ex rel.
Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 768 (Mo. 1985) (compelled service denies attorney profes-
sional choice).
61 Shapiro, supra note 3, at 768. Cf. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916) (duties
owed society not akin to African slavery).
" See, e.g., Family Div. Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 704-05 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(dismissed thirteenth amendment argument in case of non-compensated representation);
Williamson v. Vandeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982) (thirteenth amendment
never forbade compulsion of non-compensatory public service); White v. United States
Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203, 205 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981) (noncompensable appointments
constitutional under thirteenth amendment); Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 290. "[Flew of the
critics or courts that have advanced [the involuntary servitude] argument have advanced it
on any historical analysis of that Civil War enactment, or of the numerous decisions inter-
preting it over the course of a century." (citations omitted); Tudzin, supra note 4, at 120
(discussing thirteenth amendment arguments). Contra Pollack v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17
(1944). The Pollack Court suggested that the thirteenth amendment was intended "not
merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor
throughout the United States." Id.
" See Scott, 688 S.W.2d at 773 (Blackmar, J., dissenting). "If the requirement of uncom-
pensated services in a criminal case does not constitute a 'taking of property' or an 'invol-
untary servitude' . . . then it cannot be said categorically that such violations exist in civil
appointments. The two kinds of cases differ in degree but not in quality." Id.; Rosenfeld,
supra note 4, at 292. The thirteenth amendment argument "never explains why coerced
service to indigents in criminal cases does not offend the perceived right under the thir-
teenth amendment of 'all to labor in freedom' while in civil cases the violation of the provi-
sion 'is clear.'" Id.
" See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. This amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor
[shall any state] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Id.
400
Survey of Professional Responsibility
manner.6 5 Challengers of mandatory pro bono claim that this
principle is violated when lawyers are "singled out from among all
citizens or all other professionals and alone required to donate
services free of charge."66 This onus has been regarded as an un-
just tax on the legal profession67 for an obligation that should be
borne by society as a whole.6" Notwithstanding this assertion, pro-
ponents argue that "so long as the regulation imposed on [a par-
ticular] profession is rationally related to a legitimate public pur-
pose it will withstand an equal protection challenge." 69 In
65 See Southern Ry. Co. v. Green, 216 U.S. 400, 412 (1910). "[T]he equal protection of
the laws means subjection to equal laws, applying alike to all in the same situation." Id. See
also infra notes 70-71 (discussing state regulation of similar professionals under equal pro-
tection). See generally C. BURDICK, supra note 58, at §§ 279-82 (discussing application of law
under equal protection clause to similar persons under dissimilar circumstances).
" Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 294. See Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d
336, 348, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). "It is a denial of equal protec-
tion when the cost of operation of a state function, conducted for the benefit of the public,
to a particular class of persons ... ." Id. (citing Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 279
(1898). But see Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 561, 133 P.2d 325, 331 (1943)
"[T]he right to practice law in the state courts is not a privilege or an immunity ... which
is protected by the 14th [sic] amendment." Id. See generally Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 294
(pointing out when equal protection of lawyer is violated); Comment, The Uncompensated
Appointed Counsel System: A Constitutional and Social Transgression, 60 Ky. L.J. 710, 714-15
(1972) (same).
67 See Cunningham, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 352, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 864 (state should not
single out lawyers to underwrite an obligation of the tax-paying public); Humbach, supra
note 42, at 566 (discussing pro bono as special excise tax on legal profession); Shapiro,
supra note 3, at 783. " To the extent that the tax is borne by lawyers themselves, a critical
question is whether they are a more appropriate group to bear the burden than society as a
whole." Id. [A] tax or service obligation imposed on lawyers is not a desirable approach, at
least if the amount of the tax or the level of the obligation constitutes a substantial bur-
den." Id. at 784. But see Tudzin, supra note 4, at 113. "Legal tax is the answer - not paid
Pro Bono."
See DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 443 (Alaska 1987). "Because the
appointment thus benefits all persons equally the cast should be borne by all rather than
shunted to specific persons or specifically identifiable classes or persons." Id. (quoting
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)); The Florida Bar, 432 So. 2d 39, 41 (Fla.
1983). "The assurance that effective legal services are available to all is not the sole respon-
sibility of lawyers but is one to be shared by the government and society." Id.; Ex parte
Dibble, 310 S.E.2d 440, 443 (S.C. Ct. App. 1983). "It is unfair to cast on [lawyers], alone,
the burden of serving the needs of the whole society without compensation." Id. See also
Graham, supra note 20, at 64 (obligation is that of society, not solely lawyers); Tudzin,
supra note 4, at 113. "Lawyers should not be held responsible for a pervasive social prob-
lem which requires a solution from society as a whole." Id. See generally Lundberg & Bo-
dine, 50 Hours for the Poor, 73 A.B.A. J. 55 (Dec. 1987) (A.B.A. & A.M.A. state 50 hours is
proper pro bono requirement).
" Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 295. Cf. Tudzin, supra note 4, at 113. "[F]act that similar
obligations are not yet required of other professions does not give credence to the legal
profession's failure to actively aid in the advancement of social goals." Id. But see Knox
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furtherance thereof, the state is not constrained to regulate all
professions identically7 ° "so long as all members of the group [are]
being regulated in a similar manner. ' 71
CONCLUSION
There are valid arguments in opposition to a mandatory pro
bono program. When considering the magnitude of the unmet le-
gal needs of indigents and the immediacy of the problem, it is sug-
gested that these arguments are not sufficiently persuasive. Con-
cededly, the exclusive solution is not a mandatory pro bono
program. The Bar, through such a program, has the unique abil-
ity to respond swiftly and effectively to this egregious problem.
Attorneys occupy a distinguished position in our society. Perform-
ing pro bono legal services for the indigent is a responsibility that
is commensurate with that position.
Timothy R. Couch & Albert J. Galatan
County v. McCormick 217 Ind. 493, 500, 29 N.E.2d 405, 408 (1940). "[T]he public can no
longer justly demand of a [lawyer] any gratuitous services which would not be demanded of
every other [profession]." Id.
70 See Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935). Ad-
dressing a regulation that was limited to one profession, the Court stated: "The state was
not bound to deal alike with all these classes, or to strike at all evils at the same time or in
the same way. [The State] could deal with the different professions according to the needs
of the public in relation to each." Id.; Cunningham, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 222 Cal. Rptr.
861-62. It has been noted that "an attorney who is appointed to represent an indigent
without compensation is effectively forced to give away a portion of his property-his liveli-
hood. Other professionals, merchants and state licensees are not similarly required to do-
nate services and goods to the poor." Id.; Shapiro, supra note 3, at 775. "Reciprocity for
the burdens imposed or sought to be imposed upon the legal field has often been asserted
to exist in the 'monopoly' granted to lawyers for the practice of law. [W]hile a lawyer...
must share the burden, it is hard to find comparable burdens being imposed on any other
groups - even other [professionals]." Id. Cf Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 16 (1854).
The idea of [lawyers] enjoying peculiar privileges, and therefore being more honora-
ble . . . is not congenial to our institutions. And that any class should be paid for
their particular services in empty honors, is an obsolete idea, belonging to another
age and to a state of society hostile to liberty and equal rights.
Id.
7' Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 296. See Cunningham, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 351, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). "Equal protection principles are violated when one
attempts to apply a general rule of forced pro bono representation on such a diverse class
as lawyers." Id.; Shapiro, supra note 3, at 770. "The treatment of some or all lawyers
might be seen to be different from the treatment of other lawyers [and as such] to consti-
tute a denial of equal protection." Id.
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